報告題目：Optimal royalty auction with seller’s post-auction investment考慮賣方拍賣後投資的最優特許經營權拍賣
報告人🏄🏽♂️⚙️：徐欣毅（中山大學）
報告時間🎁：2021年4月15日（星期四）上午8:30-9:30
報告地點：商學院大樓318會議室
報告人簡介：
徐欣毅 博士，中山大學嶺南學院助理教授。2017年獲香港中文大學經濟學博士學位，研究領域主要包括契約理論、機製設計。
報告摘要：
We consider royalty auctions with each bidder’s payoff upon winning endogenously determined by his type and seller post-auction input. In charactering an optimal royalty auction mechanism, differ from standard approach, we first derive an upper bound value of seller’s expected payoff among all feasible mechanisms, then provide a mechanism which can obtain the upper bound value, called the optimal royalty auction mechanism. The optimal mechanism selects the bidder of the highest type among all participants provided that is greater than the threshold type, and recommends a post-auction effort as a function of the winner’s type. We show that first-price auction with full information disclosure rule can implement the optimal royalty auction mechanism.
會後簡報及工作論文請登錄奧利弗·哈特合同與治理中心網站：
https://hartcenter.ecust.edu.cn/
地址🏃🏻➡️：上海市徐匯區梅隴路130號